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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The fundamental equiprobability assumption in logical probability needs to be formulated in terms of governing laws of nature rather than structure descriptions.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Humean regularity theories of laws deny that governing laws are metaphysically distinct from observed regularities, undermining the premise that they require separate probabilistic treatment.
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    • 2.If laws just are regularities (Lewis, Earman), reformulating equiprobability in terms of governing laws collapses back into structure-description approaches, making the proposed revision circular.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Carnap's inductive logic was explicitly designed to remain neutral on metaphysical disputes about the nature of laws, so invoking governing laws imports unargued metaphysical commitments into a formal probabilistic framework.
      ?

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    • 2.A probability calculus that presupposes contested Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley necessitation relations inherits their disputed ontology, reducing the epistemic force of any probabilistic argument that relies on it.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Tooley employs a Carnapian theory in which the basic equiprobability assumption is formulated in terms of structure descriptions.
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    • 2.If governing laws are logically possible, then the fundamental equiprobability assumption needs to be formulated in terms of governing laws of nature.
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    • 3.Tooley holds that governing laws are logically possible.
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