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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    The incoherence of legislative behavior extends to the le... — Carmelics
    Home/Democracy & Governance
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The incoherence of legislative behavior extends to the level of institutional and constitutional design.

    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The logic that explains incoherence in legislative behavior applies equally to the agents who draft constitutions.
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    • 2.Constitutional designers, like legislators, have political and economic interests that shape their decisions.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Constitutional moments, as Ackerman argues, involve extraordinary politics where citizens transcend ordinary self-interest through deliberative mobilization.
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    • 2.The conditions of constitutional founding differ structurally from routine legislation, making interest-group capture empirically and theoretically less likely.
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    • 3.Madison's Federalist No. 51 demonstrates that constitutional designers explicitly anticipated factional incoherence and engineered structural remedies against it.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Rawls's veil of ignorance models a real epistemic condition present at founding moments when future political positions are genuinely uncertain to framers.
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    • 2.When designers cannot reliably predict which coalition will benefit from constitutional rules, self-interest loses determinative power over constitutional choice.
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    Topics

    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract

    Related

    Constitutional designers, like legislators, have political and economic interest...Constitutional moments, as Ackerman argues, involve extraordinary politics where...Madison's Federalist No. 51 demonstrates that constitutional designers explicitl...Rawls's veil of ignorance models a real epistemic condition present at founding ...
    +3 moreShow less
    The conditions of constitutional founding differ structurally from routine legis...The logic that explains incoherence in legislative behavior applies equally to t...When designers cannot reliably predict which coalition will benefit from constit...

    Similar

    The logic that explains incoherence in legislative behavior applies eq...84%When self-interested agents design basic social, economic, and politic...73%If foundational legal documents like constitutions are incoherent, the...71%Constitutional designers, like legislators, have political and economi...70%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: legal-econanalysis
    View source passageHide passage
    Radical political economists reject this reasoning. They carry the logic of the argument about the incoherence of legislative behavior through to the level of institutional and constitutional design. Constitutions are drafted by agents with political and economic interests that they seek to forward when they create the basic social, economic, and political institutions of the society. Incoherence may thus infect these institutions as well. The compromises over slavery in the US Constitution, for
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit