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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    The inference from 'Act A is a lie' to 'Act A is wrong' s... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    The inference from 'Act A is a lie' to 'Act A is wrong' shares key features with inductive inference.

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Like a standard inductive argument, the strength of the inference from 'Act A is a lie' to 'Act A is wrong' is not all-or-nothing.
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    • 2.Additional premises can weaken or strengthen the inference, as is characteristic of inductive reasoning.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Prima facie duties, as Rossian deontology holds, are defeasible but not probabilistic — they bind categorically unless overridden by stronger duties.
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    • 2.Inductive inference is weakened by counterexamples proportionally, but a prima facie wrong remains fully obligatory until a specific defeater obtains.
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    • 3.The logical structure of defeasibility in moral reasoning is thus closer to default logic than to Bayesian probability revision.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hare's prescriptivism holds that moral universalizability is a logical, not empirical, feature of moral terms like 'wrong'.
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    • 2.If 'lie' analytically entails prima facie wrongness via the logic of moral language, the inference is deductive-conceptual, not inductive.
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    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Additional premises can weaken or strengthen the inference, as is characteristic...Hare's prescriptivism holds that moral universalizability is a logical, not empi...If 'lie' analytically entails prima facie wrongness via the logic of moral langu...Inductive inference is weakened by counterexamples proportionally, but a prima f...
    +3 moreShow less
    Like a standard inductive argument, the strength of the inference from 'Act A is...Prima facie duties, as Rossian deontology holds, are defeasible but not probabil...The logical structure of defeasibility in moral reasoning is thus closer to defa...

    Similar

    Like a standard inductive argument, the strength of the inference from...93%The inference from 'Act A is a lie' to 'Act A is wrong' is criterial e...92%The inference from 'Act A is a lie' to 'Act A is wrong' is not grounde...92%The inference from 'Act A is a lie' to 'Act A is wrong' is not a deduc...91%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: beardsley-aesthetics
    View source passageHide passage
    for A might be right even so, when all ethically relevant factors are taken into account. If A helps to save innocent people’s lives, for example, it’s right—actually right, as Ross says—even though it’s a lie. Nor is the relation between (L) and (W) causal or inductive. Lying doesn’t cause wrongness, and although it might be that most (or even all) lies are all-things-considered wrong—actually wrong—it might be that most (or even all) lies aren’t all-things-considered wrong—actually wrong. Rega
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit