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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The move from (a) to (b) in Mann's argument is a non sequitur absent some auxiliary premise.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.For each concrete individual x there is a corresponding rich property R, and there are property instances such as the wisdom of Socrates.
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    • 2.From this it follows that for each x there is the rich property instance, the R-ness of x.
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    • 3.But everything instantiating properties (being an instance of properties) is not the same as everything being a property instance.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mann's inference from 'x instantiates R' to 'x is a property instance' illicitly collapses the instantiation relation into identity, a move Frege's concept-object distinction explicitly prohibits.
      ?

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    • 2.Without an auxiliary premise identifying the bearer of a property with the property instance itself, the inference commits the Bradley regress error of conflating relata with relations.
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    • 3.Armstrong's truthmaker theory demonstrates that the truth of 'x is F' requires a distinct ontological ground from x itself, confirming that instantiation never entails identity with what is instantiated.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aquinas's own doctrine of participation, which Mann invokes, distinguishes between a thing participating in a form and a thing being identical to that form—participation presupposes non-identity.
      ?

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    • 2.If participation entailed that the participant just is a property instance, then participated beings would be universals, contradicting the Thomistic framework Mann's argument is meant to support.
      ?

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