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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The proposed analogical inference rule (5) is unacceptable as a general rule.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The only substantive requirement introduced by rule (5) is that there be a nonempty positive analogy between source and target domains.
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    • 2.There exist analogical arguments satisfying this condition that establish no prima facie plausibility and no measure of support for their conclusions.
      ?

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    • 3.Achinstein's formal analogy between swans and line segments — mapping 'has the same color as' to 'is congruent with' on the basis of shared reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity — satisfies rule (5) but clearly establishes nothing about swans or line segments.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A valid inference rule must generate epistemic warrant across all substitution instances, not merely some privileged subset of well-chosen cases.
      ?

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    • 2.Rule (5) permits substitution instances where the positive analogy consists entirely of formally shared but materially irrelevant properties, as Achinstein's swan-segment case demonstrates.
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    • 3.Any rule that licenses epistemically inert inferences in even one class of cases fails the normative standard required of a general inference rule, by the same logic that defeats affirming the consequent.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Hempel's criterion of adequacy for confirmation requires that evidential support be sensitive to the content-specific relevance of shared properties, not merely their formal co-instantiation.
      ?

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    • 2.Rule (5) is insensitive to whether shared properties in the positive analogy are projectible in Goodman's sense — it treats 'grue'-like structural similarities as equivalent to causally grounded ones.
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    • 3.A rule that cannot discriminate projectible from non-projectible analogical bases systematically underdetermines when inductive support is genuine, rendering it unfit as a general rule.
      ?

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