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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The psychological-continuity view, as standardly stated, is false or incomplete.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The psychological-continuity view implies that any future being psychologically continuous with a person must be that person.
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    • 2.If both cerebral hemispheres are transplanted into two different bodies, both resulting persons (Lefty and Righty) are each psychologically continuous with the original person.
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    • 3.It follows from the view that the original person is identical to Lefty and also identical to Righty.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Psychological continuity is a relation that admits of degrees and branching, making it a poor candidate for grounding the strict transitivity identity requires.
      ?

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    • 2.Parfit's own argument in 'Reasons and Persons' shows that what matters in survival is psychological continuity itself, not identity, revealing the view conflates two distinct normative and metaphysical questions.
      ?

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    • 3.A view that cannot distinguish 'what matters' from 'what constitutes identity' is incomplete as a theory of personal identity, even if it succeeds as a theory of prudential concern.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Sydney Shoemaker's causal requirement—that psychological connections must be causally sustained in the right way—fails to resolve fission cases because both Lefty and Righty satisfy the causal condition equally.
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    • 2.Any supplementation of the psychological-continuity view that adds a 'no branching' clause is ad hoc, stipulating uniqueness rather than explaining why uniqueness matters metaphysically.
      ?

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    • 3.A theory that must import brute-force uniqueness constraints to block counterexamples reveals its core criterion is insufficient to do the explanatory work a theory of personal identity requires.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
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