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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The psychological-continuity view, as standardly stated, ... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The psychological-continuity view, as standardly stated, is false or incomplete.

    Personal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Psychological continuity is a relation that admits of degrees and branching, making it a poor candidate for grounding the strict transitivity identity requires.
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    • 2.Parfit's own argument in 'Reasons and Persons' shows that what matters in survival is psychological continuity itself, not identity, revealing the view conflates two distinct normative and metaphysical questions.
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    • 3.A view that cannot distinguish 'what matters' from 'what constitutes identity' is incomplete as a theory of personal identity, even if it succeeds as a theory of prudential concern.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Sydney Shoemaker's causal requirement—that psychological connections must be causally sustained in the right way—fails to resolve fission cases because both Lefty and Righty satisfy the causal condition equally.
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    • 2.Any supplementation of the psychological-continuity view that adds a 'no branching' clause is ad hoc, stipulating uniqueness rather than explaining why uniqueness matters metaphysically.
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    • 3.A theory that must import brute-force uniqueness constraints to block counterexamples reveals its core criterion is insufficient to do the explanatory work a theory of personal identity requires.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The psychological-continuity view implies that any future being psychologically continuous with a person must be that person.
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    • 2.If both cerebral hemispheres are transplanted into two different bodies, both resulting persons (Lefty and Righty) are each psychologically continuous with the original person.
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    • 3.It follows from the view that the original person is identical to Lefty and also identical to Righty.
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    Topics

    Personal Identity

    Related

    A theory that must import brute-force uniqueness constraints to block counterexa...A view that cannot distinguish 'what matters' from 'what constitutes identity' i...Any supplementation of the psychological-continuity view that adds a 'no branchi...Identity is transitive: if A = B and A = C, then B = C.
    +8 moreShow less
    If both cerebral hemispheres are transplanted into two different bodies, both re...It follows from the view that the original person is identical to Lefty and also...Lefty and Righty are numerically distinct persons after the operation.Parfit's own argument in 'Reasons and Persons' shows that what matters in surviv...Psychological continuity is a relation that admits of degrees and branching, mak...Sydney Shoemaker's causal requirement—that psychological connections must be cau...The psychological-continuity view implies that any future being psychologically ...Therefore the view entails Lefty = Righty, which contradicts the fact that they ...

    Similar

    The psychological-continuity view implies that any future being psycho...89%The psychological-continuity view generates a logical contradiction re...88%The psychological-continuity view entails the original person is both ...85%If psychological continuity is the basis of personal identity (Parfit'...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-personal
    View source passageHide passage
    But now suppose that both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head. (We needn’t pretend that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) The two recipients—call them Lefty and Righty—will each be psychologically continuous with you. The psychological-continuity view as we have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. But that cannot be: if you and Lefty are one and you
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit