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    The qualification 'qua appearances' or 'considered with o... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    The qualification 'qua appearances' or 'considered with our epistemic conditions' is redundant (otiose) when describing objects under an epistemic condition.

    PerceptionPhilosophy of Language
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that co-referential terms can differ in cognitive significance without adding ontological content.
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    • 2.If 'qua appearances' and 'spatial objects' co-refer without difference in sense, the qualification is logically idle by Frege's own criterion of informativeness.
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    • 3.A redundant qualifier that adds no new sense or reference is, by definition, otiose in any well-formed epistemic description.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's criterion of ontological commitment holds that we are committed only to what our best theories quantify over, not to how we describe what we quantify over.
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    • 2.If the domain of objects cognized under spatial conditions just is the domain of appearances, the qualifier 'qua appearances' tracks no additional variable in our ontological inventory.
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    • 3.A description that introduces no new bound variable and carves no new ontological joint adds no substantive content to the claim it modifies.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.An object must satisfy (fall under) a representation if that representation is to constitute an epistemic condition for that object.
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    • 2.If space is an epistemic condition of outer objects for us, then objects we cognize are in space simpliciter.
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    • 3.Therefore, adding the qualification 'qua appearances' adds no further content beyond saying the objects are spatial.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguagePerception

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge3 linked

    Related

    A description that introduces no new bound variable and carves no new ontologica...A redundant qualifier that adds no new sense or reference is, by definition, oti...An object must satisfy (fall under) a representation if that representation is t...Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that co-referential terms ...
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    If 'qua appearances' and 'spatial objects' co-refer without difference in sense,...If space is an epistemic condition of outer objects for us, then objects we cogn...If the domain of objects cognized under spatial conditions just is the domain of...Quine's criterion of ontological commitment holds that we are committed only to ...Therefore, adding the qualification 'qua appearances' adds no further content be...

    Similar

    Therefore, adding the qualification 'qua appearances' adds no further ...85%Beliefs are subject to epistemic norms and can be supported by epistem...79%Under representationalism, qualia-statements are equivalent to stateme...77%If an epistemic condition E does not accurately represent its objects,...76%

    Source

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    SEP: kant-transcendental-idealism
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    Robinson (1994) raises a quite general objection to Allison’s notion of an epistemic condition, namely, an object must satisfy (fall under) a representation if that representation is to constitute an epistemic condition for that object (Robinson 1994 is a response, mainly, to Allison 1983 and 1987). So in the claim that “objects qua appearances” or “objects considered with our epistemic conditions” the qualification “qua appearances” or “considered with our epistemic conditions” is otiose. If sp
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit