Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The single-state epistemic-probability model assigning profile (u, l) does not satisfy common knowledge of rationality in the relevant sense.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Common knowledge of rationality is satisfiable by any model where each player's strategy is a best response given their actual beliefs, without requiring caution.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Aumann's original formalization of common knowledge of rationality in 'Agreeing to Disagree' (1976) does not impose caution as a necessary condition on belief profiles.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The caution requirement reflects Brandenburger and Dekel's correlated rationalizability refinement, which is a substantive additional constraint beyond common knowledge of rationality itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A single-state epistemic model can satisfy common knowledge of rationality if the state space is constructed so that each player's strategy is optimal given the probability-one beliefs held at that state.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Restricting legitimate models of common knowledge of rationality to those with cautious beliefs conflates rationality under certainty with rationality under uncertainty, as Savage's expected utility framework permits degenerate probability-one beliefs as a limiting case.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Common knowledge of rationality in epistemic-probability models requires that players hold cautious beliefs.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Cautious beliefs require that a player cannot know which option her opponent will choose from a set of choice-worthy options.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.In the described game, Bob's beliefs in the single-state model are not cautious.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.