The stronger-sense interpretation of the first premiseclaims that an agent can have a reason to act only if there are some possible conditions under which the agent would be motivated to act due to psychological attitudes the agent actually has.
A stricter, more demanding way of reading or understanding a claim, as opposed to a weaker version that requires less.
agent(Economics terminology applied to medical ethics)
The party in a principal-agent relationship who is instructed to produce the good or service on the principal's behalf — in the medical context, the doctor
If we were to read the former, weaker sense of the possibility of motivation into this second premise, we get the claim that a rational, or perhaps virtuous, version of the agent would only be motivated to act in some way if the actual agent has some actual desire that could produce that motivation. This premise would be false if agents could be irrational or vicious precisely because they lack certain desires, a common view we discussed in section 1.3. Suppose we try instead to understand the f