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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Tarskian/Davidsonian approach to semantics is parsimonious compared to propositional semantic theories

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Davidsonian truth theories require a satisfaction relation holding between sequences of objects and open sentences, which is itself a substantial ontological commitment.
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    • 2.The infinite sequences of objects posited by Tarski's recursive satisfaction clauses are no less ontologically costly than the structured propositions or intensions they are meant to replace.
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    • 3.Parsimony comparisons must be made across the full ontological inventory of a theory, not merely by noting the absence of one category of posit.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Davidson's truth-theoretic semantics requires axioms that pair expressions with extensions, but extensions (sets of possible satisfiers) implicitly invoke intensional distinctions to handle modal and attitude contexts.
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    • 2.Foster's objection demonstrates that a Davidsonian T-theory requires supplementation with meaning-theoretic knowledge to connect truth conditions to understanding, reintroducing unexplained semantic primitives.
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    • 3.A theory that achieves surface parsimony only by displacing unexplained semantic work into its metatheory is not genuinely more parsimonious than theories that explicitly theorize those commitments.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The Davidsonian truth-theoretic approach makes no use of intensions, Russellian propositions, or Fregean senses
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    • 2.Propositional semantic theories require positing intensions, Russellian propositions, or Fregean senses as semantic entities
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