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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The theory that saying and believing are relations to particular physical tokens of sentences is implausible.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If believing were a relation to a particular physical token, then destroying that token would void the corresponding belief.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Destroying a physical inscription of a sentence does not void the belief that was expressed by that inscription (e.g., destroying a token of a sentence Seneca believed would not have voided Seneca's belief).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The same belief (e.g., that snow is white) can be held by speakers of different languages, none of whose sentence tokens are identical in any physical respect.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If believing were a relation to physical tokens, type-identical beliefs across languages would be impossible, contradicting the evident fact of cross-linguistic propositional agreement (Frege, 'The Thought', 1918).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Any adequate theory of belief must preserve the transitivity of shared belief content across distinct physical realizations.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Beliefs exhibit intentionality—they are intrinsically about something—but physical tokens have no intrinsic aboutness, only derived meaning (Searle, Intentionality, 1983).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A relation requiring one relatum to possess a property the other cannot possess in principle is metaphysically incoherent.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.