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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The threat to build a sewage disposal plant is incredible... — Carmelics
    Home/Justice & Punishment
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The threat to build a sewage disposal plant is incredible and should be ignored by the threatened party.

    ConsequentialismJustice & Punishment
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If the landowner refuses to sell, carrying out the threat would damage the threatener as well as the threatened party.
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    • 2.It is not in the threatener's interest to carry out a threat that harms themselves.
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    • 3.A rational agent will not execute a threat whose execution is against their own interest.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Agents can credibly commit to seemingly irrational threats by visibly delegating execution authority to a party with different interests (Schelling, 'The Strategy of Conflict', 1960).
      ?

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    • 2.Once commitment devices are in place, the threatener's dominant strategy shifts such that execution becomes rational, restoring credibility.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Reputation effects across repeated interactions make executing costly threats rational, as Kreps and Wilson's 1982 'reputation model' demonstrates.
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    • 2.A threatener who accepts short-term loss to punish defection gains long-run credibility, making the threat genuinely rational to carry out.
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    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentConsequentialism

    Connections

    2 topics

    Moral Responsibility3 linkedTruth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    A rational agent will not execute a threat whose execution is against their own ...A threatener who accepts short-term loss to punish defection gains long-run cred...Agents can credibly commit to seemingly irrational threats by visibly delegating...If the landowner refuses to sell, carrying out the threat would damage the threa...
    +4 moreShow less
    It is not in the threatener's interest to carry out a threat that harms themselv...Once commitment devices are in place, the threatener's dominant strategy shifts ...Reputation effects across repeated interactions make executing costly threats ra...

    Similar

    If a landowner refuses to sell, the threatening party is contractually...79%Because the threat is not credible, the threatened party should respon...76%The threatened party's rational response depends on whether the threat...75%Selling the land to the threatening party is the landowner's available...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    Consider the following hypothetical example (which is not a PD). Suppose you own a piece of land adjacent to mine, and I’d like to buy it so as to expand my lot. Unfortunately, you don’t want to sell at the price I’m willing to pay. If we move simultaneously—you post a selling price and I independently give my agent an asking price—there will be no sale. So I might try to change your incentives by playing an opening move in which I announce that I’ll build a putrid-smelling sewage disposal plant
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The threatened party knows that executing the threat is against the threatener's...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit