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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The zombie argument against physicalism fails because zombies are not metaphysically possible, even if they are conceptually possible.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The anti-physicalist zombie argument requires metaphysical possibility of zombies, not merely conceptual possibility.
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    • 2.Zombies may be conceptually possible (no obvious contradiction in the idea) without being metaphysically possible.
      ?

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    • 3.Granting conceptual possibility alone does not entail metaphysical possibility.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's modal semantics shows that identity statements like 'pain = C-fiber firing' are rigid designators, necessary if true at all.
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    • 2.If physicalist type-identity holds necessarily, then a world with physical duplicates but absent qualia violates the necessity of that identity.
      ?

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    • 3.Therefore zombie conceivability reflects an epistemic gap in our concepts, not a genuine metaphysical possibility, as Levine's explanatory gap argument itself concedes.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Chalmers' conceivability-to-possibility inference presupposes that ideal rational reflection eliminates all epistemic illusions about modal space.
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    • 2.Phenomenal concepts, as argued by Papineau and Loar, have a dual character that makes it coherent to conceive of qualia without physical descriptions without tracking distinct metaphysical facts.
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    • 3.When phenomenal concepts refer to physical states via direct acquaintance rather than descriptive modes, conceiving zombies reflects conceptual duplication, not ontological separation.
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