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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    There are no desert-entailing differences between moral a... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    There are no desert-entailing differences between moral agents.

    Moral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Moral luck is encompassing in its influence on agents' characters, actions, and outcomes.
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    • 2.Differences between agents in character, actions, and outcomes are generated by luck.
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    • 3.Differences generated by luck do not provide a sound basis for differential treatment of people in terms of moral praise and blame.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Agents exercise genuine rational self-governance through reflective endorsement of desires, constituting authorship that is not reducible to causal antecedents.
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    • 2.Frankfurt's hierarchical model shows that identification with first-order desires via second-order volitions grounds desert independently of the causal history of those desires.
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    • 3.If the capacity for reflective endorsement itself varies among agents, these structural differences in rational agency are sufficient to ground differential desert attributions.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes framework grounds moral responsibility in interpersonal relationships, not metaphysical luck-free origination.
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    • 2.The practice of holding responsible is justified by the quality of will expressed in an agent's conduct, which remains attributable to the agent regardless of its causal origins.
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    • 3.Levy's argument conflates the causal genesis of character with the attributability of character to the agent, a distinction Scanlon's 'reasons-responsiveness' account preserves.
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    Moral Responsibility

    Related

    Agents exercise genuine rational self-governance through reflective endorsement ...Differences between agents in character, actions, and outcomes are generated by ...Differences generated by luck do not provide a sound basis for differential trea...Frankfurt's hierarchical model shows that identification with first-order desire...
    +5 moreShow less
    If the capacity for reflective endorsement itself varies among agents, these str...Levy's argument conflates the causal genesis of character with the attributabili...Moral luck is encompassing in its influence on agents' characters, actions, and ...P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes framework grounds moral responsibility in int...The practice of holding responsible is justified by the quality of will expresse...

    Similar

    Non-moral agents lack receptivity to moral considerations.79%If there is no relevant difference between two agents, they must be ev...79%A more promising denial is that there are ultimately no persons to bea...77%Non-moral agents should not be attributed moral responsibility.76%

    Source

    AI-extracted2/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-responsibility
    Levy's 'hard luck view' (2011)
    View source passageHide passage
    The above quotations notwithstanding, Nagel himself doesn’t fully embrace a skeptical conclusion about responsibility on grounds of moral luck, but others have done so, most notably, Neil Levy (2011). According to Levy’s “hard luck view”, the encompassing nature of moral luck means “that there are no desert-entailing differences between moral agents” (2011: 10). Of course, there are differences between agents in terms of their characters and the good or bad actions and outcomes that they produce, but Levy’s point is that, given the influence of luck in generating these differences, they don’t ...
    Extraction notes

    The premises accurately capture Levy's reasoning as presented in the passage: the encompassing nature of moral luck generates the differences between agents, and since luck-generated differences don't ground differential desert, there are no desert-entailing differences between moral agents.

    Validity:

    Confidence: Clearly attributed argument from Levy, premises and conclusion explicitly stated in the text.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit