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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that There are no desert-entailing differences between moral agents.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Agents exercise genuine rational self-governance through reflective endorsement of desires, constituting authorship that is not reducible to causal antecedents.
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    • 2.Frankfurt's hierarchical model shows that identification with first-order desires via second-order volitions grounds desert independently of the causal history of those desires.
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    • 3.If the capacity for reflective endorsement itself varies among agents, these structural differences in rational agency are sufficient to ground differential desert attributions.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes framework grounds moral responsibility in interpersonal relationships, not metaphysical luck-free origination.
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    • 2.The practice of holding responsible is justified by the quality of will expressed in an agent's conduct, which remains attributable to the agent regardless of its causal origins.
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    • 3.Levy's argument conflates the causal genesis of character with the attributability of character to the agent, a distinction Scanlon's 'reasons-responsiveness' account preserves.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Moral luck is encompassing in its influence on agents' characters, actions, and outcomes.
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    • 2.Differences between agents in character, actions, and outcomes are generated by luck.
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    • 3.Differences generated by luck do not provide a sound basis for differential treatment of people in terms of moral praise and blame.
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