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    There can be no vague or indeterminate identity between d... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    There can be no vague or indeterminate identity between distinct objects (in the sense that vaguely identical objects must be absolutely distinct).

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.x is not vaguely identical to x.
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    • 2.If x is assumed to be vaguely identical to y, then by Leibniz's Law, x and y differ in some property (namely, being vaguely identical to x).
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    • 3.By Leibniz's Law, if x and y differ in a property, then x and y are absolutely distinct.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz's Law applies only determinately: if it is indeterminate whether x=y, it is indeterminate whether the law's antecedent conditions are met.
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    • 2.When it is indeterminate whether x has a property P, we cannot determinately conclude x and y differ, only that it is indeterminate whether they differ.
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    • 3.Evans's argument illicitly treats 'vaguely identical to x' as a determinate property, but on supervaluationist semantics, indeterminate predicates lack classical extensions.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Gareth Evans's proof assumes that '∇(x=y)' attributing vague identity to x is a genuine, determinate property of x, but this begs the question against metaphysical indeterminacy.
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    • 2.On a Barnes-Williams ontic vagueness account, the world itself can be unsettled, so Leibniz's Law governs only determinate property-possession, not indeterminate cases.
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    • 3.If indeterminacy is located in the objects rather than representations, distinct objects can share indeterminate identity without contradiction, since classical logic does not straightforwardly apply.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Related

    By Leibniz's Law, if x and y differ in a property, then x and y are absolutely d...Evans's argument illicitly treats 'vaguely identical to x' as a determinate prop...Gareth Evans's proof assumes that '∇(x=y)' attributing vague identity to x is a ...If indeterminacy is located in the objects rather than representations, distinct...
    +5 moreShow less
    If x is assumed to be vaguely identical to y, then by Leibniz's Law, x and y dif...Leibniz's Law applies only determinately: if it is indeterminate whether x=y, it...On a Barnes-Williams ontic vagueness account, the world itself can be unsettled,...When it is indeterminate whether x has a property P, we cannot determinately con...x is not vaguely identical to x.

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-relative
    View source passageHide passage
    The general form of Church’s argument has been exploited by others to reach further puzzling conclusions. For example, it has been used to show that there can be no such thing as vague or “indeterminate” identity (Evans 1978; and for discussion, Parsons 2000). For \(x\) is not vaguely identical to \(x\); hence, if \(x\) is assumed to be vaguely identical to \(y\), then by LL, \(x\) and \(y\) are (absolutely) distinct. As it stands, Evans’ argument shows at best that vaguely identical objects mus
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit