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    There is no non-natural property of goodness — Carmelics
    Statements
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    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Virtue Ethics
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    There is no non-natural property of goodness

    Truth & KnowledgeVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Moore's open question argument shows 'good' cannot be defined by any natural property without generating a meaningful residual question.
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    • 2.If 'good' were a natural property, 'Is what maximizes pleasure actually good?' would be trivially analytic, but it is clearly synthetic.
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    • 3.The non-trivial openness of such questions reveals that natural properties exhaust descriptive facts, leaving 'goodness' as a conceptual redundancy.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mackie's argument from queerness establishes that non-natural properties would require a bizarre metaphysical category unlike anything in empirical science.
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    • 2.Ockham's razor demands we not multiply entities beyond necessity when expressivism or error theory can explain moral discourse without non-natural properties.
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    • 3.Blackburn's quasi-realism demonstrates that all functional roles attributed to non-natural goodness can be preserved within a naturalistic, projectivist framework.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.There is significant diversity of moral opinion across individuals and cultures
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    • 2.Ultimate values cannot be proven when moral opinions diverge
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    Topics

    Virtue EthicsTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Skepticism2 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Blackburn's quasi-realism demonstrates that all functional roles attributed to n...If 'good' were a natural property, 'Is what maximizes pleasure actually good?' w...Mackie's argument from queerness establishes that non-natural properties would r...Moore's open question argument shows 'good' cannot be defined by any natural pro...
    +4 moreShow less
    Ockham's razor demands we not multiply entities beyond necessity when expressivi...The non-trivial openness of such questions reveals that natural properties exhau...There is significant diversity of moral opinion across individuals and cultures

    Similar

    Russell can resist Moore's conclusion that goodness is a non-natural p...91%If 'good' cannot be defined in natural terms, the property of goodness...89%Goodness is a non-natural property88%Moral properties are not natural properties86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russell-moral
    View source passageHide passage
    So what were Russell’s reasons for rejecting a non-natural property of goodness? One argument, subsequently popularized by J.L. Mackie (1977) as “the Argument from Relativity”, starts with the diversity of moral opinion and the supposed impossibility of proof when it comes to ultimate values.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Ultimate values cannot be proven when moral opinions diverge
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit