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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Token physicalism does not provide a necessary condition for physicalism.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Consider a social or legal object such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.According to token physicalism, if physicalism is true, there must be some physical object or particular that the court is identical with.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Intuitively, there is no physical object that the court is identical with.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Physicalism requires that all facts supervene on physical facts, a condition that token identity cannot capture for multiply realizable or functional entities.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.As Jaegwon Kim argues in 'Mind in a Physical World', token identity leaves open whether mental or social properties are genuinely grounded in physics or merely correlated with it.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A necessary condition for physicalism must rule out property dualism, which token physicalism explicitly permits by allowing non-physical property types over physical tokens.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frank Jackson's knowledge argument and David Chalmers' conceivability arguments show that token physicalism is consistent with qualia being non-physical properties, undermining any claim it is necessary for physicalism.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If token physicalism were a necessary condition, then a world with physical tokens bearing irreducibly non-physical phenomenal properties would count as physicalist, which contradicts the standard supervenience-based formulations of Hellman and Thompson.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.