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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Type-type identity theory offers a solution to the explanatory gap problem with respect to qualia.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Identity claims require that co-referring terms share all explanatory properties, but 'pain' and 'C-fiber firing' differ in their epistemic accessibility and explanatory roles.
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    • 2.Levine's explanatory gap shows that even if identity holds metaphysically, the conceptual disconnect between phenomenal and physical descriptions remains unexplained.
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    • 3.A theory that stipulates identity without closing the conceptual gap merely relocates the problem rather than dissolving it.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke argued that psychophysical identity statements, unlike 'water is H2O', cannot be necessary a posteriori because phenomenal properties are essentially what they appear to be.
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    • 2.If 'pain is C-fiber firing' is contingent, the identity theory fails to eliminate the gap; if necessary, it requires an explanation of why the identity is not knowable a priori that type identity theory cannot supply.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The explanatory gap problem asks how neural properties cause or give rise to conscious qualitative properties.
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    • 2.Treating the psycho-physical link as an identity eliminates the need to explain how neural properties cause conscious qualitative properties.
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    • 3.If qualia are identical to neural properties, the explanatory gap does not exist.
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