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    Veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experience... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experiences must themselves be different experiences

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Seen objects are constituents of veridical visual experiences
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    • 2.Seen objects are not constituents of hallucinatory experiences
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Disjunctivism conflates the metaphysics of experience-constitution with the epistemology of experience-discrimination.
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    • 2.The fact that an object is a constituent of a veridical experience does not entail that its absence produces a subjectively different experience-type.
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    • 3.Austin and Ayer's debate over the argument from illusion shows that object-presence underdetermines phenomenal character.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by the intrinsic neural states of the subject, not by external objects.
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    • 2.If two experiences are neurally identical, they are phenomenally identical regardless of whether an object is causally present.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    Austin and Ayer's debate over the argument from illusion shows that object-prese...Disjunctivism conflates the metaphysics of experience-constitution with the epis...If two experiences are neurally identical, they are phenomenally identical regar...Seen objects are constituents of veridical visual experiences
    +3 moreShow less
    Seen objects are not constituents of hallucinatory experiencesThe fact that an object is a constituent of a veridical experience does not enta...The phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by the intrinsic n...

    Similar

    Veridical visual experiences have seen objects as constituents while h...90%If veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experiences share a ...87%Seen objects are not constituents of hallucinatory experiences81%Perceptual experiences are not intersubjectively accessible in the sam...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia
    View source passageHide passage
    Sometimes relationists try to motivate their view by arguing that since the seen objects are constituents of veridical visual experiences and they are not in the case of hallucinatory experiences, the experiences in the two cases must themselves be different. However, even if this is correct, it does not follow that they cannot share the same phenomenal character. What follows is rather that if they do share a common phenomenal character, then the conscious experiences are not to be individuated
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit