Wolff

Without independent moral grounding, aesthetic experience's natural tendency to morally good outcomes can be perverted.

Pleasurable sentiments are a primary constituent of happiness.

Aesthetic experience is of indirect moral value.

Art can be put to perverse and immoral use as well as healthy and good use.

Works of art make abstract moral precepts effective on our action.

Aesthetic experience is of direct moral value.

Free and unhindered activity of the representational capacity produces pleasurable sentiments.

Aesthetic experience is a variety of free and unhindered activity of the representational capacity.

Works of art enliven our abstract knowledge of moral precepts.

An independent grasp of and commitment to fundamental moral principles is necessary even given art's natural tendency toward moral good.

Sulzer's moral theory is not egocentric.

Without independent moral grounding, aesthetic experience's natural tendency to morally good outcomes can be perverted.

Pleasurable sentiments are a primary constituent of happiness.

Normal human beings naturally desire for others what they desire for themselves.

Aesthetic experience is of indirect moral value.

Normal human beings naturally desire for others what they desire for themselves.

Normal human beings naturally recognize the right of others to that for which they claim a right for themselves.

The goal of the moral life is happiness, and whatever contributes to happiness is at least prima facie good.

Those who desire happiness for themselves naturally desire it for others as well.