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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object distinct from itself, given that a first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Causal sufficiency in a deterministic sense does not preclude the logical possibility that a second deity's sustaining activity is metaphysically necessary for continued existence.
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    • 2.Leibniz's distinction between sufficient reason for origination and sufficient reason for continuation implies that a cause sufficient to produce a being need not be sufficient to preserve it.
      ?

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    • 3.If a second god is a necessary condition for the persistence of contingent beings, it remains a necessary condition of their existence even when a first god is sufficient for their initiation.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.In Neoplatonic emanationist frameworks, such as those of Plotinus and Proclus, distinct divine principles serve non-redundant causal roles at different ontological levels of reality.
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    • 2.A cause that is sufficient for producing an effect at one level of being need not be sufficient to account for all the structural conditions that make that effect the kind of thing it is.
      ?

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    • 3.Therefore, a second divine principle can remain a necessary condition for specific constitutive features of contingent beings even when a first divine principle is sufficient for their bare existence.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being, then the second god is not a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object distinct from itself.
      ?

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