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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that An agent can form an intention of the form 'I intend that we X' without requiring certainty about the partner's intentions.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bratman's planning theory requires that intentions be action-guiding in ways that presuppose commitments from all relevant agents, not merely probabilistic forecasts.
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    • 2.An intention directed at a joint outcome ('we X') that lacks assurance of the partner's reciprocal commitment is merely a wish or hope, not a genuine intention in Bratman's technical sense.
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    • 3.Conflating reliable prediction with sufficient grounding for intention collapses the distinction between intending and expecting, undermining the normative role intentions play in practical reasoning.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Searle's account of collective intentionality holds that 'I intend that we X' is only coherent as a genuine we-intention when it is already embedded in a pre-reflective sense of shared agency, not derivable from individual predictive reasoning.
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    • 2.If the intention's validity depended solely on one agent's predictive confidence about the other, it would reduce collective intention to a conjunction of individual intentions, which Searle explicitly identifies as a reductive fallacy.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.An agent forming the intention 'I intend that we X' does so under the assumption that the partner does or will come to intend likewise.
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    • 2.An agent is typically in a position to reliably predict whether the other will come to form a corresponding intention.
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    • 3.Reliable prediction is sufficient to ground the intention without requiring certainty.
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