Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective becaus... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' violate the condition that one can only control one's own actions.

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Bratman's own planning theory requires that intentions be action-guiding only over what falls within the agent's direct volitional control.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Anscombe's account of intentional action in 'Intention' ties the scope of intention strictly to what the agent herself does, not what others do.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.An intention whose success conditions essentially include another agent's voluntary action conflates intending with hoping or willing an outcome.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frankfurt's hierarchical account of agency entails that genuine intention requires the capacity to endorse and execute the relevant action through one's own will.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.No agent can form a genuinely action-guiding plan over behavior that depends irreducibly on a separate agent's autonomous choice, as Michael Bratman himself acknowledges in his conditions for mesh subplans.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If 'I intend that we X' is basic, it generates a regress: each participant's intention requires the other's cooperation, which itself requires prior cooperative intention, with no non-circular grounding.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the intentionality of joint action.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.One can only control one's own actions, not those of other agents.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language

    Related

    An intention whose success conditions essentially include another agent's volunt...Anscombe's account of intentional action in 'Intention' ties the scope of intent...Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the inten...Bratman's own planning theory requires that intentions be action-guiding only ov...
    +4 moreShow less
    Frankfurt's hierarchical account of agency entails that genuine intention requir...If 'I intend that we X' is basic, it generates a regress: each participant's int...No agent can form a genuinely action-guiding plan over behavior that depends irr...One can only control one's own actions, not those of other agents.

    Similar

    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions ...99%Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions ...96%Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to...84%One can only intend one's own action, not the actions of others.81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: collective-intentionality
    View source passageHide passage
    Thus, the claim here is that intentions of the form “I intend that we X” are basic to the intentionality of joint action. Critics have argued that Bratman’s account is defective in so far as it treats intentions of that form as basic, since they violate either (1) the condition that one can only intend one’s own action, or (2) the condition that one can only control one’s own and no other agent’s actions, or (3) the condition that one can only intend what one can take to be in a position to sett
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit