Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' violate the condition that one can only intend what one is in a position to settle.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the intentionality of joint action.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.One can only intend what one can take oneself to be in a position to settle.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Bratman's own agency-condition requires that intentions settle matters within the agent's own future conduct, not outcomes dependent on others' independent choices.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Another agent's participation in a joint action is not within one's own power to settle unilaterally, as their will remains irreducibly external to one's practical reasoning.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, 'I intend that we X' smuggles a cooperative outcome into the content of a unilateral mental state, violating the agential scope that makes intention normatively coherent.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Michael Bratman himself concedes in 'Faces of Intention' that intention must be appropriately responsive to the agent's own volitional control over the intended state of affairs.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Anscombe's foundational treatment of intention in 'Intention' (1957) grounds the concept in the agent's practical knowledge of what they are doing, not what others will do.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Intentions whose satisfaction conditions include the independent future agency of others cannot generate the same first-person practical commitments Bratman relies on to explain coordination and meshing subplans.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.