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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Conceptual possibility is too weak to establish metaphysical possibility without further qualification and argument.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.For phenomenal concepts, conceivability tracks metaphysical possibility more reliably than for ordinary empirical concepts, because phenomenal concepts refer directly via acquaintance rather than via contingent descriptions.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The Michael Tye impostor case fails as a disanalogy because it exploits description-mediated reference, whereas zombie conceivability arguments exploit purely demonstrative, acquaintance-based reference that cannot misfire in the same way.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If phenomenal concept reference is essentially indexical and non-descriptive, then the gap between conceptual and metaphysical possibility that Kripke identifies for natural kinds and persons does not generalize to phenomenal properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Chalmers' two-dimensional semantic framework distinguishes primary intensions from secondary intensions, allowing conceivability arguments to be run at the level of primary possibility without illicitly inferring secondary metaphysical possibility.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.When a scenario is positively conceivable under the primary intension of all terms involved, this constitutes evidence of genuine metaphysical possibility that the supporting argument's single-intension treatment of 'conceptual possibility' fails to rebut.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.It is conceptually possible that Michael Tye is not actually Michael Tye (e.g., an impostor or someone misinformed about his past).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Given the actual facts, it is metaphysically impossible that Michael Tye is not Michael Tye.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, conceptual possibility does not entail metaphysical possibility.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.