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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even a single part does not preserve identity

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The Kripkean argument entails that O and S are not the same ship
      ?

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    • 2.The gradual-replacement argument entails that O and S are the same ship
      ?

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    • 3.These two conclusions are contradictory
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's modal essentialism entails that origin facts are metaphysically necessary, making even single-part substitution identity-threatening.
      ?

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    • 2.If origin essentialism holds, the gradual-replacement argument's conclusion that O equals S merely reflects epistemic tolerance, not metaphysical identity.
      ?

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    • 3.Apparent contradictions between Kripkean and gradual-replacement conclusions dissolve once we distinguish loose, practical identity-talk from strict metaphysical identity.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Chisholm's mereological essentialism entails that any object has all its parts essentially, so single-part replacement produces a numerically distinct object.
      ?

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    • 2.If mereological essentialism is true, the gradual-replacement argument's premise that O survives part-substitution is simply false, removing the alleged contradiction.
      ?

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    • 3.The apparent force of the gradual-replacement argument depends on the four-dimensionalist conflation of temporal stages with persisting objects, a conflation Kripkean ontology rejects.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.