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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Epistemic logic can express principles that AGM belief revision and non-monotonic logic cannot straightforwardly express

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.AGM belief revision can be extended to iterated revision via Darwiche and Pearl's (1997) postulates, which encode higher-order doxastic states in epistemic entrenchment orderings.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Once iterated AGM revision is formalized, the principle Bp → BBp can be captured by constraints on the agent's conditional belief structure without modal operators.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The principle Bp → BBp is rejected by most epistemologists as psychologically unrealistic and is explicitly denied in weak S4-alternatives like the logic KD45 without positive introspection.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If Bp → BBp is not a universally valid epistemic principle, then AGM's silence on it reflects a theoretical virtue rather than an expressive limitation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Epistemic logic can express the principle that if an agent believes p, then the agent also believes that the agent believes p (Bp → BBp)
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.AGM belief revision cannot clearly express iterated belief (BBp) because membership in a belief set does not straightforwardly encode higher-order belief
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Non-monotonic logic cannot straightforwardly express the principle Bp → BBp either
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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