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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Global supervenience and strong individual supervenience are not equivalent concepts.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Global supervenience entails strong individual supervenience when combined with the assumption that possible worlds are individuated solely by their intrinsic qualitative character.
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    • 2.If worlds are purely qualitative constructs with no primitive thisness, then indiscernible individuals across worlds collapse into identity, dissolving the asymmetry the supporting argument requires.
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    • 3.Haecceitism—the doctrine that grounds the purported counterexamples—is itself a contentious metaphysical posit, not a neutral logical datum, making the non-equivalence claim metaphysically loaded rather than analytically secure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Jaegwon Kim's 1984 formal reconstruction shows that under any mereologically closed property space, global supervenience and strong supervenience are provably co-extensional.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The supporting argument's counterexample tacitly restricts the B-base to local intrinsic properties, but global supervenience is defined over total world-histories including all relational and structural properties.
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    • 3.When the full relational structure of a world is included in the B-base, no two worlds can share a global B-distribution while harboring B-indiscernible yet A-discernible individuals, collapsing the alleged distinction.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Strong individual supervenience of A on B requires that any two possible worlds with B-indiscernible individuals must also be A-indiscernible.
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    • 2.There exist possible worlds w1 and w2 where individual x in w1 is B-indiscernible from individual x* in w2 yet A-discernible from x* in w2, violating strong individual supervenience.
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    • 3.Global supervenience of A on B requires only that worlds with the same global distribution of B-properties have the same global distribution of A-properties.
      ?

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