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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    God can believe the same propositions we do without there... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    God can believe the same propositions we do without thereby acquiring present-time knowledge or first-person knowledge of someone else.

    Divine Attributes
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Knowledge of the present and of oneself may involve eternally true propositions, where what changes is our access to the propositions rather than the propositions themselves.
      ?

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    • 2.Such knowledge involves a special 'direct grasp' of a proposition, which leaves it open that God could believe the same propositions without ending up with present-time or first-person knowledge of someone else.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Indexical propositions like 'I am in pain now' are not reducible to eternal propositions without loss of cognitive content, as Perry (1979) demonstrated.
      ?

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    • 2.If the proposition believed by God is the eternal variant, it is a numerically distinct proposition from the indexical one, so God and the agent do not believe the same proposition.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.First-person knowledge is constitutively tied to a particular perspective; Nagel and Castañeda argue no perspective-neutral proposition can fully capture 'what it is like' to be a specific subject.
      ?

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    • 2.If God's belief of a proposition lacks the requisite first-person perspective, it cannot be the same belief state, and the claim that God believes 'the same proposition' equivocates on propositional identity.
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    Topics

    Divine Attributes

    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Related

    First-person knowledge is constitutively tied to a particular perspective; Nagel...If God's belief of a proposition lacks the requisite first-person perspective, i...If the proposition believed by God is the eternal variant, it is a numerically d...Indexical propositions like 'I am in pain now' are not reducible to eternal prop...
    +2 moreShow less
    Knowledge of the present and of oneself may involve eternally true propositions,...Such knowledge involves a special 'direct grasp' of a proposition, which leaves ...

    Similar

    Such knowledge involves a special 'direct grasp' of a proposition, whi...89%God can believe the same propositions we do without getting first-pers...86%The relevant propositions do not include God's own haecceity, so he do...77%One gets a first-person belief by believing a proposition including on...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: omniscience
    View source passageHide passage
    Omniscience is supposed to be knowledge that is maximal or complete. Perhaps knowledge of all truths, as (D1) puts it, captures that idea. But there are other features that might be included in such maximal knowledge when it is had by a perfect being. For example, perhaps a perfect being does not merely believe all true propositions but, in addition, could not possibly be mistaken. Perhaps, in other words, such a being is infallible, that is, necessarily such that any proposition it believes is true. Van Inwagen (2006: 26) adds to his variant of (D1) that it is impossible that there is a propo...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit