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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Ideas of pains, colors, and sounds must be innate rather than adventitious in origin

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Locke's empiricist program demonstrates that all simple ideas, including pain and color, can be fully derived from sensation and reflection without positing innate content.
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    • 2.The genetic fallacy embedded in Descartes' inference conflates the causal origin of an idea with its epistemic or ontological status as 'innate' rather than 'adventitious'.
      ?

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    • 3.If 'innate' means only that the mind has a capacity to produce such ideas when triggered, this is trivially compatible with adventitious origins and dissolves the distinction Descartes relies upon.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Sellars and later representationalists show that sensory qualities can be functionally constituted by their causal-relational roles to external stimuli, making non-resemblance insufficient to establish innateness.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.P4's claim that nothing resembling pain or color exists in bodies does not entail innateness, since the mind could still construct qualitative content through reliable causal co-variation with physical states, as reliabilist accounts of perception maintain.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The human (embodied) mind has the faculty or capacity to have sensory ideas of pains, colors, sounds, and so on
      ?

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    • 2.These sensory ideas are occasioned by certain motions in the brain
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    • 3.Nothing of the motions in the brain is transferred to the mind
      ?

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    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.