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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Identity phenomenalism is incompatible with Kant's argument in the Refutation of Idealism

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Kant argues that self-consciousness requires the existence of permanent objects in space
      ?

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    • 2.There is no permanent representation in the mind (B278)
      ?

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    • 3.If objects just are representations, then none of the objects are permanent
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant's Refutation requires that outer objects serving as the permanent substratum of time-determination are mind-independent in the transcendental sense.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Identity phenomenalism, following Berkeley, identifies outer objects with bundles of representations, denying any mind-independent substratum.
      ?

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    • 3.A view that denies transcendentally mind-independent substrata cannot satisfy Kant's criterion for grounding temporal self-location, as Allison argues in 'Kant's Transcendental Idealism'.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant's notion of permanence in B278 requires that what is permanent endures through time independently of any particular act of apprehension.
      ?

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    • 2.On identity phenomenalism, as articulated by Falkenstein and criticized by Langton, representations are inherently episodic and dependent on being apprehended.
      ?

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    • 3.No collection of inherently episodic, apprehension-dependent entities can constitute the kind of enduring, non-episodic permanent that Kant's transcendental argument structurally demands.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.