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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experiences share a common phenomenal character, then conscious experiences are not to be individuated solely by phenomenal character

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Phenomenal character just is the subjective 'what it's like' quality, which by definition exhausts the intrinsic nature of experience.
      ?

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    • 2.If two experiences are phenomenally indistinguishable from the inside, they share all phenomenally relevant properties, leaving no residue for further individuation.
      ?

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    • 3.The disjunctivist move of positing unseen objects as constituents smuggles in non-phenomenal facts to do the individuation work, changing the subject from phenomenology to metaphysics.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Representationalist accounts (Tye, Dretske) hold that phenomenal character is fully determined by the intentional content of experience, not by object-constituency.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If hallucinatory and veridical experiences share the same narrow intentional content, they thereby share the same phenomenal character and are correctly individuated by it alone.
      ?

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    • 3.The disjunctivist's appeal to object-constituency conflates the metaphysical question of what makes an experience veridical with the phenomenological question of what individuates its character.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Veridical visual experiences have seen objects as constituents while hallucinatory experiences do not
      ?

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    • 2.Two experiences can share phenomenal character while differing in their object-constituents
      ?

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