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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Kripke's challenge to the mind-brain identity theory fails because it relies on a false assumption about our knowledge of brain events

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's challenge assumes that we know from common sense, physics, and neurophysiology what brain events are like
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    • 2.Those sources only tell us about structural properties of brain events, not their underlying non-structural properties
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    • 3.Therefore, the assumption Kripke's challenge relies on is false
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's modal argument assumes pain's phenomenal essence is fully transparent to introspection, but introspection is a fallible and theory-laden cognitive process.
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    • 2.If introspective reports underdetermine the true nature of pain states, the apparent conceivability of pain without C-fiber firing may reflect epistemic limits, not genuine metaphysical possibility.
      ?

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    • 3.Russellian monism provides a principled explanation: phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical dispositions, dissolving the explanatory gap Kripke exploits.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke treats 'pain' as a rigid designator picking out a purely phenomenal property, but this presupposes a Cartesian conception of mental properties that is independently contested.
      ?

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    • 2.If, following Place and Smart's topic-neutral analysis, mental concepts describe functional-causal roles rather than intrinsic qualia, then 'pain' and 'C-fiber firing' can rigidly co-designate the same underlying physical state without modal residue.
      ?

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