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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Many of our own acts are known with certainty equal to first principles

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Introspective reports about mental acts are systematically fallible, as Freudian unconscious motivation and Nisbett & Wilson's 1977 empirical work on introspection demonstrate.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If our access to our own acts were genuinely certain, self-deception would be conceptually impossible, yet self-deception is a well-documented and philosophically robust phenomenon.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Certainty equal to first principles requires indubitability, but acts of willing or perceiving can be doubted under Cartesian dream and demon scenarios without contradiction.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Scotus's argument against infinite regress in contingent knowledge presupposes that immediate apprehension of one's own acts constitutes propositional knowledge, which Sellars's critique of the Myth of the Given denies.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If immediate acquaintance with mental acts does not automatically yield justified belief-that, then the regress problem Scotus cites fails to establish certainty rather than mere causal reliability of inner sense.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Some contingent propositions must be known immediately, without derivation from other propositions
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If no contingent proposition were known immediately, either a contingent proposition would follow from a necessary proposition (which is impossible) or there would be an infinite regress in contingent propositions (in which case no contingent proposition would ever be known)
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The contingency of our acts is not a disqualifying objection
      ?

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    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.