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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Necessitism is an essential component of possibilism, not merely a natural complement to it.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Possibilism can ground modal truth in abstract possible worlds as primitive entities rather than in the modal properties of concrete individuals.
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    • 2.If possible worlds themselves are necessary existents (as Lewis and Plantinga both hold for their respective frameworks), possibilism inherits necessitarian truthmakers without requiring necessitism about individuals.
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    • 3.Therefore possibilism's justificatory structure does not depend on the necessary existence of possibilia, severing the claimed essential connection.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Williamson's own necessitism entails that merely possible individuals exist as necessary but propertyless abstracts, which are ontologically discontinuous from the robust possibilia possibilists invoke.
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    • 2.A possibilism grounded in contingently existing but modally rich possibilia is coherent if one accepts a deflationary truthmaker theory where modal truths require only their truth conditions, not existing grounds.
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    • 3.The claim that necessitism is essential to possibilism conflates Williamson's specific theoretical package with possibilism as a general modal-ontological commitment.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The central justification for possibilism is that it provides truthmakers for modal propositions by grounding them in the modal properties of individuals.
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    • 2.If the purported truthmakers for modal propositions could fail altogether to exist, then for all we know there may in fact be no such truthmakers.
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    • 3.If there are no truthmakers for modal propositions, possibilism's central philosophical justification collapses.
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