Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Non-intentional accounts of self-deception that deny the ... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Non-intentional accounts of self-deception that deny the contradictory belief requirement should not suppose that self-deceivers are typically responsible for their self-deception.

    Moral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Mele's motivational account, self-deception arises from subpersonal positive and negative misidentification biases operating below reflective awareness.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Processes genuinely below the threshold of reflective access fall outside the scope of reasons-responsiveness conditions Frankfurt and Fischer require for moral responsibility.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, non-intentional self-deception lacks the mechanism-level control that compatibilist frameworks demand before attributing responsibility.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Vargas's revisionary account grounds moral responsibility in whether an agent's behavior is governed by a system sensitive to moral reasons.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Subpersonal biasing mechanisms that generate non-intentional self-deception operate independently of the agent's moral reasons-tracking system, bypassing it rather than corrupting it.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.An agent whose false belief is produced by a process that bypasses rather than engages their reasons-sensitive faculty cannot be held responsible for that belief under any plausible revisionary account.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Self-deceivers rarely possess the requisite awareness of the biasing mechanisms operating to produce their self-deceptive belief.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Lacking awareness of these biasing mechanisms, self-deceivers do not know when or on which beliefs such mechanisms operate.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Without knowing when or on which beliefs the mechanisms operate, self-deceivers are unable to curb the effects of these mechanisms, even when the mechanisms produce false beliefs about morally significant matters.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Topics

    Moral Responsibility

    Key Terms

    Contradictory belief requirement(a condition some philosophers think is necessary for self-deception)
    The idea that self-deception requires you to simultaneously hold two opposite beliefs at the same time (like believing both 'my partner doesn't care' and 'my partner cares').
    Non-intentional accounts(describing a type of theory about self-deception)
    Explanations of self-deception that say you don't deliberately trick yourself—it happens automatically, without you consciously deciding to deceive yourself.
    Responsible(in ethics and moral philosophy)
    Able to be fairly blamed or held accountable for something you did, usually because you had control over your actions and understood what you were doing.
    Self-deception(Zhu Xi's account of wrongdoing)
    Allowing oneself to ignore the promptings of one's moral sense and become motivated solely by physical desires

    Related

    An agent whose false belief is produced by a process that bypasses rather than e...Lacking awareness of these biasing mechanisms, self-deceivers do not know when o...Moral responsibility for self-deception requires the kind of awareness and contr...On Mele's motivational account, self-deception arises from subpersonal positive ...
    +6 moreShow less
    Processes genuinely below the threshold of reflective access fall outside the sc...Self-deceivers rarely possess the requisite awareness of the biasing mechanisms ...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: self-deception
    View source passageHide passage
    Levy (2004) has argued that non-intentional accounts of self-deception that deny the contradictory belief requirement should not suppose that self-deceivers are typically responsible, since it is rarely the case that self-deceivers possess the requisite awareness of the biasing mechanisms operating to produce their self-deceptive belief. Lacking such awareness, self-deceivers do not appear to know when or on which beliefs such mechanisms operate, rendering them unable to curb the effects of thes
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Subpersonal biasing mechanisms that generate non-intentional self-deception oper...
    Therefore, non-intentional self-deception lacks the mechanism-level control that...
    Vargas's revisionary account grounds moral responsibility in whether an agent's ...
    Without knowing when or on which beliefs the mechanisms operate, self-deceivers ...

    Similar

    A dispositional account of self-deception should be developed that foc...88%Self-deceivers may have an obligation to overcome self-deception even ...86%Self-deception can be explained without attributing either the welcome...86%Selectivity in self-deception can be explained without positing an int...85%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit