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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Non-intentional accounts of self-deception that deny the contradictory belief requirement should not suppose that self-deceivers are typically responsible for their self-deception.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Self-deceivers rarely possess the requisite awareness of the biasing mechanisms operating to produce their self-deceptive belief.
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    • 2.Lacking awareness of these biasing mechanisms, self-deceivers do not know when or on which beliefs such mechanisms operate.
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    • 3.Without knowing when or on which beliefs the mechanisms operate, self-deceivers are unable to curb the effects of these mechanisms, even when the mechanisms produce false beliefs about morally significant matters.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Mele's motivational account, self-deception arises from subpersonal positive and negative misidentification biases operating below reflective awareness.
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    • 2.Processes genuinely below the threshold of reflective access fall outside the scope of reasons-responsiveness conditions Frankfurt and Fischer require for moral responsibility.
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    • 3.Therefore, non-intentional self-deception lacks the mechanism-level control that compatibilist frameworks demand before attributing responsibility.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Vargas's revisionary account grounds moral responsibility in whether an agent's behavior is governed by a system sensitive to moral reasons.
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    • 2.Subpersonal biasing mechanisms that generate non-intentional self-deception operate independently of the agent's moral reasons-tracking system, bypassing it rather than corrupting it.
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    • 3.An agent whose false belief is produced by a process that bypasses rather than engages their reasons-sensitive faculty cannot be held responsible for that belief under any plausible revisionary account.
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