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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Normative reasons are not true propositions.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Propositions are abstract and representational (they represent the way the world is).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Normative reasons must be concrete and non-representational (they are ways the world is).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If something is abstract and representational, it cannot be concrete and non-representational.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Reasons function as explanatory and justificatory relata in practical reasoning, not as truth-apt representations of states of affairs.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Bernard Williams's internalism demonstrates that reasons must connect to an agent's motivational set, which propositions qua abstract objects cannot do.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If normative reasons were true propositions, the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen) would be unresolvable, since propositions lack the evaluative directionality reasons require.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.John Broome's distinction between 'that'-clauses and facts shows that what reasons consist in are worldly facts, not the propositional contents that represent them.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Facts, understood as obtaining states of affairs in the tradition of Armstrong and early Wittgenstein, are ontologically distinct from true propositions even when they are co-extensional.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.