Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Normativists who appeal to Rosen's distinction face a special challenge: they must show that semantics needs a normative construal, not merely that it could be given one.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Railton and other Cornell realists argue that functional-role explanations in semantics are explanatorily incomplete without appeal to normative standards that govern correct application.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the non-normative semantic base relation underdetermines which extensions are correct across novel cases, then normative construal is not merely optional but required to close the explanatory gap.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Kripke's rule-following considerations show precisely that no purely descriptive fact fixes the unique correct projection of a rule, making normative supplementation a theoretical necessity, not a luxury.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rosen's distinction between 'could be construed normatively' and 'needs a normative construal' presupposes a sharp metaphysical/conceptual divide that quietists like Wittgenstein deny is principled.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If normative and descriptive vocabularies are mutually irreducible but co-applicable to the same domain, then showing a normative construal is possible constitutes partial evidence that it is necessary for a complete semantic theory.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.These normativists grant that the basic semantic relation is non-normative.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the basic semantic relation is non-normative, the relevant question shifts from whether semantic correctness could be given a normative construal to whether semantics needs such a construal.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.