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    Carmelics

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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) is equivalent to a nominalist paraphrase sentence (N) and that neither entails the existence of a property.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's criterion of ontological commitment entails that quantifying over Fs in any sentence commits one to the existence of Fs.
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    • 2.A paraphrase sentence (N) that preserves truth conditions must quantify over the same entities as (P), preserving the original commitment.
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    • 3.Therefore, equivalence of (P) and (N) cannot eliminate the ontological commitment present in (P) without altering truth conditions.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Schiffer's 'something from nothing' objection holds that trivial inferences like 'x is courageous, therefore x has the property of courage' are valid.
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    • 2.If such inferences are valid, then any nominalist paraphrase (N) that is equivalent to (P) must also license the same inferences to property-talk.
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    • 3.A paraphrase strategy that blocks these licensed inferences changes the semantic content of (P), undermining the claimed equivalence.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.On the paraphrase-nominalist view, (P) says the very same thing as (N).
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    • 2.Neither (P) nor (N), on this view, entails the existence of Gness.
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