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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Personal identity over time is constituted by psychological continuity rather than memory alone

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Psychological continuity admits of degrees, making it unsuitable as a criterion for the all-or-nothing relation of numerical identity.
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    • 2.If personal identity can be 'more or less,' then survival across fission cases yields two equally valid successors, violating identity's transitivity.
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    • 3.Parfit's own conclusion—that what matters is not identity but psychological continuity—concedes that this criterion replaces rather than constitutes personal identity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Bodily and biological continuity grounds psychological continuity causally, making the psychological relation derivative rather than constitutive of personal identity.
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    • 2.Animalists like Olson argue we are fundamentally human organisms, so personal identity must track the persistence conditions of biological entities, not mental states.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.A person x existing at one time is the same thing as something y existing at another time if and only if x is psychologically continuous with y
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    • 2.The psychological continuity criterion avoids the most obvious objections to the memory criterion of personal identity
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