Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Psychologism about motivating reasons entails that we can... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Psychologism about motivating reasons entails that we can never act for a good reason.

    Moral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On psychologism, motivating reasons are belief-desire pairs, which represent the world but are not themselves worldly facts (Smith 1994).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A reason that merely represents a good reason inherits no normative force from what it represents, just as a map of gold is not gold.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, the psychological state qua motivator is normatively inert, meaning one never acts *for* a good reason but only *under the influence* of a representation of one.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Parfit's distinction between object-given and state-given reasons shows that states which cause action generate only state-given reasons, which are by definition not reasons grounded in the objective value of outcomes.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Good reasons, as Scanlon argues in 'Being Realistic About Reasons', must be grounded in facts about the world that obtain independently of whether any agent has a relevant attitude.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Psychologism collapses this independence by making the agent's mental state constitutive of the motivating reason, thereby severing the connection to mind-independent normative facts that 'good reasons' require.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.To act for a good reason, one must act for a reason that is or could be a fact.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.According to psychologism, motivating reasons are mental states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A mental state can never be a fact.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind2 linked

    Related

    A mental state can never be a fact.A reason that merely represents a good reason inherits no normative force from w...According to psychologism, motivating reasons are mental states.Good reasons, as Scanlon argues in 'Being Realistic About Reasons', must be grou...
    +6 moreShow less
    On psychologism, motivating reasons are belief-desire pairs, which represent the...Parfit's distinction between object-given and state-given reasons shows that sta...Psychologism collapses this independence by making the agent's mental state cons...Therefore, the psychological state qua motivator is normatively inert, meaning o...Therefore, under psychologism, the reasons for which we act are never facts, and...To act for a good reason, one must act for a reason that is or could be a fact.

    Similar

    If motivating reasons were facts (or putative facts), then we can, and...88%Psychologism about motivating reasons is false85%Explanatory reasons were not distinguished from motivating reasons.84%Agents can have reasons they are unaware of, which therefore do not mo...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: reasons-just-vs-expl
    View source passageHide passage
    Dancy’s charge against psychologism about motivating reasons is that it fails to meet the constraint because, if psychologism is right, we can never act for a good reason. Why? In order to act for a good reason, we need to act for a reason that is or could be a fact. However, according to psychologism, motivating reasons are mental states. If so, the reasons for which we act are mental states, and not facts. If, by contrast, motivating reasons were, say facts and putative facts, then some of the
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit