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    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    42
    Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism ca... — Carmelics
    Home/Aesthetics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism cannot salvage color realism.

    Aesthetics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism are phenomenally inadequate.
      ?

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    • 2.Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism fail to account for a range of color phenomena.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dispositionalism, as defended by Johnston and Lewis, grounds color properties in counterfactual relations to normal perceivers under standard conditions, preserving objective reference.
      ?

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    • 2.Phenomenal inadequacy of a theory does not entail the falsity of the metaphysical realism the theory supports, only the inadequacy of that particular reduction.
      ?

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    • 3.A revised dispositionalism that incorporates pluralist perceptual norms, as Shoemaker and Cohen argue, can accommodate variation phenomena without abandoning realism.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Reductive physicalism identifying colors with surface spectral reflectance properties, as defended by Hilbert and Tye, anchors colors to mind-independent physical magnitudes that explain perceptual success.
      ?

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    • 2.The phenomenal inadequacy objection conflates the epistemic role of color experience with the ontological question of what colors are, a distinction Byrne and Hilbert explicitly defend.
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    Topics

    AestheticsPerception

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind2 linked

    Related

    A revised dispositionalism that incorporates pluralist perceptual norms, as Shoe...Dispositionalism, as defended by Johnston and Lewis, grounds color properties in...Phenomenal inadequacy of a theory does not entail the falsity of the metaphysica...Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism are phenomenally inadequa...
    +3 moreShow less
    Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism fail to account for a ran...Reductive physicalism identifying colors with surface spectral reflectance prope...The phenomenal inadequacy objection conflates the epistemic role of color experi...

    Similar

    Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism fail to account...85%A color representation cannot oppose or inhibit a taste representation...75%The Property View underestimates the important differences between col...74%Invert is not systematically misperceiving the colors of things74%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: color
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    The most general argument for Color Irrealism/Eliminativism is addressed to the ordinary conception of color (and the use of ordinary color terms.) The argument, in brief is that Color Primitivism gets it right about the kinds of properties colors are:simple, qualitative, intrinsic properties, typically possessed by surfaces of material bodies. Only, material bodies do not actually have them. Thus there are two crucial steps in the argument for Color Irrealism/Eliminativism: the first is to argu
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit