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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism cannot salvage color realism.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Dispositionalism, as defended by Johnston and Lewis, grounds color properties in counterfactual relations to normal perceivers under standard conditions, preserving objective reference.
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    • 2.Phenomenal inadequacy of a theory does not entail the falsity of the metaphysical realism the theory supports, only the inadequacy of that particular reduction.
      ?

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    • 3.A revised dispositionalism that incorporates pluralist perceptual norms, as Shoemaker and Cohen argue, can accommodate variation phenomena without abandoning realism.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Reductive physicalism identifying colors with surface spectral reflectance properties, as defended by Hilbert and Tye, anchors colors to mind-independent physical magnitudes that explain perceptual success.
      ?

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    • 2.The phenomenal inadequacy objection conflates the epistemic role of color experience with the ontological question of what colors are, a distinction Byrne and Hilbert explicitly defend.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism are phenomenally inadequate.
      ?

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    • 2.Reductive Color Physicalism and Color Dispositionalism fail to account for a range of color phenomena.
      ?

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