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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Representationalism provides a simple account of entailment relations between qualia-statements in terms of the apparent structure of the objects of experiences.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Chalmers' hard problem demonstrates that no account of representational or functional structure logically entails facts about phenomenal character.
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    • 2.Entailment relations among qualia-statements presuppose that qualia are fully characterized by their representational roles, which begs the question against property dualists.
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    • 3.A 'simple' representationalist account of qualia-entailments thus masks a substantive and contested metaphysical commitment rather than offering a neutral logical analysis.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Qualia-statements can come apart from representational content, as Block's absent qualia cases show functional/representational equivalence without qualitative identity.
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    • 2.If qualia are not reducible to representational content, entailment relations among qualia-statements cannot be explained solely by the structure of represented objects.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Under representationalism, qualia-statements are equivalent to statements about how things appear (e.g., 'e has Q_{Rx ∧ Sq(x)}' is equivalent to 'e is an experience of something's looking red and square').
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    • 2.The entailment 'e is an experience of something's looking red and square' entails 'e is an experience of something's looking red' follows clearly from the apparent structure of the represented content.
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