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    Reputation-based traits can arise in repeated games when ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Reputation-based traits can arise in repeated games when each generation plays the entire game

    Moral ResponsibilitySocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.In Neyman's model, players can only play mixtures of pure strategies programmable on finite automata
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    • 2.The number of available states is fixed exogenously by the modeler
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    • 3.Each generation plays the entire repeated game, allowing reputation effects to accumulate across rounds
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Finite automata constraints artificially bound cognitive complexity, making reputation effects an artifact of the model's architecture rather than emergent rationality.
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    • 2.When the number of automaton states is exogenously fixed, reputation-building reflects imposed structural limits, not genuine strategic reasoning about future interactions.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Binmore and Samuelson argue that evolutionary stability in repeated games requires generational turnover, not full-game play within a single generation.
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    • 2.If each generation plays the entire repeated game, selection pressures cannot distinguish between strategies that differ only in late-game behavior, undermining reputation's adaptive grounding.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilitySocial Contract

    Connections

    3 topics

    Truth & Knowledge2 linkedModality & Possibility2 linkedConsequentialism1 linked

    Related

    Binmore and Samuelson argue that evolutionary stability in repeated games requir...Each generation plays the entire repeated game, allowing reputation effects to a...Finite automata constraints artificially bound cognitive complexity, making repu...If each generation plays the entire repeated game, selection pressures cannot di...
    +3 moreShow less
    In Neyman's model, players can only play mixtures of pure strategies programmabl...The number of available states is fixed exogenously by the modeler

    Similar

    Each generation plays the entire repeated game, allowing reputation ef...81%Reputation can be built up only through play of a repeated game.77%Success in evolutionary game theory is measured by the number of copie...72%Under replicator dynamics, strictly dominated strategies can persist i...71%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: bounded-rationality
    View source passageHide passage
    Since tit-for-tat is a very simple strategy, computationally, one can begin to explore a notion of rationality that emerges in a group of boundedly rational agents and even see evidence of those bounds contributing to the emergence of pro-social norms. Rubinstein (Rubinstein 1986) studied finite automata which play repeated prisoner’s dilemmas and whose aims are to maximize average payoff while minimizing the number of states of a machine. Finite automata capture regular languages, the lowest-le
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    When the number of automaton states is exogenously fixed, reputation-building re...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit