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    In Neyman's model, players can only play mixtures of pure... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Reputation-based traits can arise in repeated games when each generation plays the entire game

    In Neyman's model, players can only play mixtures of pure strategies programmable on finite automata

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

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    Moral Responsibility2 linked

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    Each generation plays the entire repeated game, allowing reputation effects to a...Reputation-based traits can arise in repeated games when each generation plays t...The number of available states is fixed exogenously by the modeler

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    For finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas, finite automata players who...77%If players in a game reach the (C,C) equilibrium under conditions wher...77%A strictly dominated strategy will never be rational under any epistem...76%Rational players with common belief in rationality will choose iterati...75%

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    SEP: bounded-rationality
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    Since tit-for-tat is a very simple strategy, computationally, one can begin to explore a notion of rationality that emerges in a group of boundedly rational agents and even see evidence of those bounds contributing to the emergence of pro-social norms. Rubinstein (Rubinstein 1986) studied finite automata which play repeated prisoner’s dilemmas and whose aims are to maximize average payoff while minimizing the number of states of a machine. Finite automata capture regular languages, the lowest-le

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