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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    The claim that A and A' differ because A' comes into exis... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The claim that A and A' differ because A' comes into existence after A is not well supported

    Modality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Temporal location alone cannot individuate objects if we accept four-dimensionalism, since temporal parts share existence across time.
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    • 2.On Sider's stage theory, what persists is a counterpart relation, not strict identity, so A' coming later does not preclude being the same sandal as A.
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    • 3.If mere temporal position were sufficient to distinguish A from A', then temporal duplicates in branching-time models would be numerically distinct, which is widely rejected.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wiggins's sortal-relative identity requires that identity conditions be fixed by the kind-term, not by spatio-temporal origin alone.
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    • 2.The kind 'sandal' does not include a temporal-origin criterion in its persistence conditions, unlike biological kinds governed by Kripkean essentialism.
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    • 3.Without a kind-relative reason to privilege original temporal position, the claim that A and A' differ merely because A' comes later is unsupported by the sortal itself.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.A cannot be supposed to persist after A' comes into existence
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    • 2.We do not end up with two new sandals and one old one after the parts exchange
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    • 3.There is no reason why it couldn't be A itself that reappears at the later time
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    A cannot be supposed to persist after A' comes into existenceIf mere temporal position were sufficient to distinguish A from A', then tempora...On Sider's stage theory, what persists is a counterpart relation, not strict ide...Temporal location alone cannot individuate objects if we accept four-dimensional...
    +5 moreShow less
    The kind 'sandal' does not include a temporal-origin criterion in its persistenc...There is no reason why it couldn't be A itself that reappears at the later timeWe do not end up with two new sandals and one old one after the parts exchangeWiggins's sortal-relative identity requires that identity conditions be fixed by...Without a kind-relative reason to privilege original temporal position, the clai...

    Similar

    Carter's argument against the claim that S and S' are identical fails84%Therefore C and D must be identical, contradicting the hypothesis that...82%Carter (1987) claims in effect that S and S' are not identical80%Measurements of P and Q are incompatible.80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-relative
    View source passageHide passage
    The problem with (2) is this. Pick a simple sort of objects, say, shoes, or better, sandals. Suppose \(A\) and \(B\) are two exactly similar sandals, one of which \((A)\) is brand new and the other \((B)\) is worn out. Each consists of a top strap and a sole, nothing more. If \(B\)’s worn strap is replaced by \(A\)’s new one, (2) dictates that the resulting sandal is \(B\) “refurbished.” In fact, if the parts of \(A\) and \(B\) are simply exchanged, (2) dictates that that the sandal with the new
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit